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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Johnny Jay Diamond appeals from the district court’s order summarily
dismissing his amended post-conviction petition.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Diamond pled guilty to Aiding and Abetting Robbery. (R., p. 147.) The
district court placed Diamond on probation. (Id.) Diamond appealed, and his
sentence was affirmed on appeal. (Id.) Diamond violated his probation and the
district court revoked his probation and sent Diamond on a rider program. (Id.)
Following the rider program, the district court again placed Diamond on
probation. (Id.) The district court later revoked probation and placed Diamond
on a ten-year period of unsupervised probation. (Id.) Diamond again violated
probation. (R., p. 148.) The district court revoked Diamond’s probation and
executed a reduced sentence. (Id.) Diamond then filed a Rule 35 motion, which
was denied. (Id.)
Diamond filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief. (R., pp.
11-33.) Diamond alleged that his continued incarceration violated the Eighth
Amendment. (R., p. 14.) Diamond also claimed that his attorney was ineffective
for failing to object to the revocation of his probation. (R., pp. 18-19.)
The district court issued a pre-trial order requiring Diamond to file an
Amended Petition within 28 days and setting out the requirements for the
Amended Petition. (R., pp. 44-45.)
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The Amended Application must: 1) fully comply with the required
format of I.C.R. 57(a); 2) specifically set forth the grounds upon
which the application is based, and 3) clearly state the relief
desired as required by Idaho Code §19-4903. The purpose of this
order is to expedite “the disposition of the action” pursuant to Rule
16(a)(1) and to improve the quality of the proceedings through
“more thorough preparation” pursuant to Rule 16(a)(4). The
amended application shall, in all respects, comply with Idaho Code
§ 19-4903.
(R., pp. 44-45 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).)
Diamond filed an Amended Post Conviction Petition. (R., pp. 54-57.) The
Amended Petition stated there was an appeal from the original judgment of
conviction or imposition of sentence. (R., p. 55.) The Amended Petition alleged
that Diamond had a potential defense to his final probation violation that was not
presented by his trial counsel:
9.

The facts upon which the Petitioner seeks relief are as follows:

The basis for the last Motion to Revoke Probation was on
the Petitioner’s failure to pay fines, fees and restitution. However,
the Petitioner had no ability to make such payments. Petitioner
received advice from his prior counsel that he should admit to the
probation violation and Petitioner was not advised that a defense to
the probation violation would be an inability to pay. As such, the
Petitioner was denied effective assistance counsel and denied due
process. Had Petitioner been advised that he had a defense to the
probation violation he would have insisted on an evidentiary
hearing, would have prevailed and would not have been committed.
(R., pp. 55-56.)

Diamond’s Amended Petition sought “to have the Order of

Commitment vacated and to be placed back on probation.” (R., p. 56.) The
Amended Petition included a paragraph incorporating “his original Petition and
Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief as if fully set forth herein.” (R., p. 56.) The
state answered. (R., pp. 58-61.)
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The state objected to Diamond’s attempt to incorporate the original
Petition and Affidavit into the Amended Petition. (R., pp. 59-60.) The state also
requested the district court take judicial notice of certain documents from the
underlying criminal case. (R., pp. 62-146.)
The district court entered a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Petition for PostConviction Relief. (R., pp. 147-153.) The district court explained that it had
required Diamond to file an Amended Petition and that the Amended Petition
contained one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., p. 148.)
Diamond’s Amended Petition makes one claim: that he was
never advised that inability to pay was a defense to a probation
violation for failure to pay restitution. Thus, he claims that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel.
(R., p. 148.) The court gave notice it intended to dismiss Diamond’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because the claim was “bare, conclusory, and
contradicted by the record.” (R., p. 148.)
Diamond responded to the district court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss. (R.,
pp. 154-157.)

Diamond argued that he had presented enough evidence to

warrant an evidentiary hearing to show he had a defense to the probation
violation that was not presented by his trial counsel. (R., pp. 154-155.) Diamond
argued:
The facts set forth by the Petitioner and the transcript in the
record clearly show that Petitioner has an argument regarding his
ability to meet his financial obligations. That was the only alleged
probation violation. To this issue he should have an evidentiary
hearing.
(R., p. 155.) Diamond further explained:
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Stating that the Petitioner could not meet the financial
obligations and that Petitioner was denied a defense due to
improper advice, coupled with the belief that the outcome would
have been different, is the best Petitioner can do when the hearing
wasn’t even held. This is enough to raise a genuine issue of
material fact. These claims are supported by the record, the
reporter’s transcript and Petitioner’s Verified Petition.
(R., p. 156.) Diamond’s response did not challenge the district court’s conclusion
that Diamond’s Amended Petition only contained one claim. (See R., pp. 154157.) Nor did Diamond’s response assert there were more claims contained
within the Amended Petition. (See Id.)
The district court considered Diamond’s response but dismissed his
Amended Petition because the response “failed to remediate the deficiencies
pointed out in the court’s Notice of Intent[.]” (R., p. 160.) The district court
explained:
[Diamond’s] response contains no new evidence, by affidavit
or otherwise. Instead, it argues that the Amended Petition did raise
genuine issues of material fact regarding the failure of the
Petitioner’s prior counsel to advise him to raise the defense of
inability to meet his financial obligations. The response goes on to
argue that had the Petitioner raised this defense instead of
admitting to a probation violation, he would not have been found in
violation and his probation would not have been revoked.
This argument conflates a finding of a probation violation
with a finding that the violation was willful. Idaho’s appellate courts
have held that these are separate determinations. See State v.
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that a trial court must first decide whether a condition of
probation was actually violated – a question of fact – followed by a
determination regarding whether or not the violation justifies
revoking probation-a matter of discretion). Only once the court
determines that the probationer has in fact violated the terms of his
or her probation may the court then make the separate inquiry into
whether that violation was willful or non-willful. State v. Sanchez,
149 Idaho 102, 106, 233 P.3d 33, 37 (2009).
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Here, the Petitioner faced a probation violation for failing to
pay his court ordered financial obligations. He admitted to this
violation and then proceeded to disposition, wherein the court
determined, after the Petitioner’s counsel and the Petitioner himself
presented considerable evidence as to his inability to pay, that the
violation was indeed willful. Therefore, the Petitioner did present
the defense of inability to pay at the proper time in the probation
violation proceedings.
(R., pp. 158-159.)

The district court entered judgment.

Diamond timely appealed. (R., pp. 164-166.)
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(R., pp. 162-163.)

ISSUE
Diamond states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Diamond’s
amended petition for post-conviction relief because the court did
not address the issues raised in the initial petition?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Diamond failed to show the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed Diamond’s amended petition for post-conviction relief after Diamond
was given adequate notice?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court’s Notice Of Intent To Dismiss Addressed The Only Claim
Raised By Diamond’s Amended Petition
A.

Introduction
Diamond argues that the district court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss did not

address two claims in his initial petition which were allegedly incorporated into
Diamond’s Amended Petition.

(See Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)

Specifically,

Diamond argues that the Notice of Intent to Dismiss did not address his claim
that his criminal attorney was ineffective for failing to file an appeal and did not
address his claim that he was incarcerated beyond his release date in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
Diamond is correct that the district court dismissed his Amended Petition
without specifically addressing these claims. Contrary to Diamond’s assertions,
however, the district court did not err by doing so because the Amended Petition
did not incorporate these two claims. The Amended Petition specifically stated
that Diamond’s counsel had filed an appeal. (R., p. 55.) The Amended Petition
also sought to have Diamond placed back on probation. (R., p. 56.) If Diamond
were raising a claim that he was incarcerated past his release date, as he had in
his initial petition, the Amended Petition would not have sought to have him
placed back on probation.
Additionally, Diamond’s response to the district court’s Notice of Intent to
Dismiss did not reference these additional claims, nor did Diamond’s response
challenge the district court’s notice that Diamond was only raising one claim in
post-conviction. (See R., pp. 154-157.) The district court gave adequate notice
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that it was going to dismiss Diamond’s one claim and on appeal Diamond has
failed to show the district court erred.
B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists which, if resolved in petitioner’s favor, would require relief to be granted.
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The
court freely reviews the district court’s application of the law. Id. at 434, 835 P.2d
at 669. The court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions
of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001).
C.

The District Court Correctly Summarily Dismissed Diamond’s Amended
Post-Conviction Petition After Giving Diamond Adequate Notice Of The
Basis For Dismissal Of The Only Claim In The Amended Petition
Diamond argues that the district court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss did not

address the claims he raised in his initial petition, and incorporated into his
Amended Petition, and thus the case should be remanded for consideration of
the unaddressed claims. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-7.) Diamond is incorrect. The
district court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss gave proper notice on the one claim
asserted by Diamond before the district court.
“Idaho Code § 19-4906 permits a court to rule summarily on applications
for post-conviction relief.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798,
803 (2007).

“A court may grant the motion of either party under I.C. § 19-
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4906(c), or may dismiss the application sua sponte under I.C. § 19-4906(b).” Id.
Summary disposition of a post-conviction petition “is appropriate if the applicant’s
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 522, 164 P.3d at 802
(citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)). “When the court considering the petition for postconviction relief is contemplating dismissal sua sponte, it must notify the parties
of its intention to dismiss and must provide its reasons for the potential
dismissal.”

Banks v. State, 123 Idaho 953, 954, 855 P.2d 38, 39 (1993)

(citations omitted); see also I.C. § 19-4906(b).

The purpose of the notice

requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) is to give the petitioner the opportunity to
provide further legal authority or evidence to establish a genuine issue of
material fact. Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991);
State v. Christensen, 102 Idaho 487, 489, 632 P.2d 676, 678 (1981).
On appeal, Diamond argues that his Amended Petition incorporated two
claims that were alleged in his initial petition. (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) First, “Mr.
Diamond asserted that he requested that his attorney file an appeal but he
‘never heard any further about it’ and was time barred.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6
(citing R., p. 12.).) Second, Diamond “asserted that he had been incarcerated
beyond his release date” which “Mr. Diamond alleged…was a violation of the
Eighth Amendment.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (citing R., pp.13-14).)
First, Diamond’s appellate argument, that his Amended Petition raised a
claim relating to his counsel’s failure to file an appeal, is not supported by the
record. While Diamond’s initial petition did state that his criminal counsel did not
file an appeal, neither his initial nor his amended petition ever alleged any facts

9

or made an ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to failing to file an
appeal.

(See R., pp. 11-33, pp. 54-57.)

Moreover, the Amended Petition

asserted there actually was an appeal from the judgment of conviction or
imposition of sentence. (R., p. 55.)
6. Was there an appeal from the judgment of conviction or
imposition of sentence?
[ X ] Yes
(R., p. 55.)

[ ] No

This is also supported by the district court’s Notice of Intent to

Dismiss, which stated “Diamond then appealed and his sentence was affirmed.”
(R., p. 147.)

Diamond’s response to the district court’s Notice of Intent to

Dismiss did not challenge this statement. (See R., pp. 154-156.) Contrary to
Diamond’s argument on appeal, neither his initial petition nor amended petition
raised a claim regarding his trial counsel’s alleged failure to file an appeal.
Second, Diamond argues that his Amended Petition incorporated the
claim, alleged in his initial petition, “that he had been incarcerated beyond his
release date” which “Mr. Diamond alleged…was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 6 (citing R., pp.13-14).)

Diamond now

argues that the district court’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss did not address this
“claim.” (R., pp. 5-6.) The initial petition is not clear whether this is a separate
claim or part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, or vice versa. (See
R., pp. 11-23.) Regardless, to the extent this was a separate Eighth Amendment
claim, Diamond’s Amended Petition eliminated it. The Amended Petition listed
the specific grounds on which relief was sought, and the Eighth Amendment was
not listed. (See R., p. 55.) Nor was this allegation included in the “facts upon
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which the Petitioner seeks relief[.]” (Id.) The relief sought by the Amended
Petition was to “have the Order of Commitment vacated and to be placed back
on probation.” (R., p. 56.) If Diamond’s claim was that he was being held past
his sentence release date—he could not be seeking relief to be placed back on
probation.
The Amended Petition raised one claim – i.e., that Diamond’s counsel
was ineffective in relation to the revocation of Diamond’s probation. (See R., pp.
54-57.) The Notice of Intent to Dismiss states that Diamond’s amended petition
raises “one claim” (R., p. 148) and Diamond’s response to the notice did not
challenge or refute that statement.

(R., pp. 154-157.)

Therefore, Diamond

cannot now on appeal claim the district court erred by not making findings
regarding his other “claims.” See I.R.C.P. 52(b) (A party may not assign error
regarding a lack of specific findings unless that party raised that issue before the
district court.). Diamond’s argument on appeal, that the district court’s Notice of
Intent to Dismiss failed to address all of Diamond’s claims, is without support.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 31st day of March, 2016.
_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of March, 2016, served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

TST/dd

_/s/ Ted S. Tollefson___
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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